Energy technology executive and engineer
I help energy developers and investors identify equipment, performance, warranty, and supply-chain risks before they become expensive project problems. I also provide fractional CTO leadership to early-stage energy hardware companies.
72%
of the battery storage failures in EPRI's incident database happened during construction, commissioning, or the first two years of operation.
EPRI, PNNL, and TWAICE, 2024 analysis of EPRI's BESS Failure Incident Database
Specializing in
Equipment gets bought off a datasheet. The cells come from a factory nobody on the buyer's team has walked, and the warranty has gaps nobody priced. Then the utility study comes back and the site takes a fraction of the load it was planned around. Owners usually find this out at commissioning, when fixes cost the most.
A storage or microgrid project is a 20-year bet on equipment you didn't build and a utility you don't control. Most of the risk gets locked in during the first few months, in the spec and the contract. After that you are managing what you signed. I want to be in the room before anyone signs.
On the owner's side. I've spent most of my career on the buyer's side of the table with equipment makers and the contractors who build the job, and in front of utilities on interconnection. I've also designed and built storage equipment myself, so I know which numbers to push on. I never work for an equipment vendor, and I take no vendor-paid referrals. I disclose any past relationship with a supplier before I start.
About to sign for equipment? Email me first.
Email meFor developers, owners, and the people who finance them. I read what you are about to sign, check it against the factory and the test data, and stay through commissioning.
The load, the date, and the number the financing depends on. Everything downstream hangs on those answers, so I pin them down first and put them in writing.
Datasheets and certificates are a starting point. I check them against the test reports, the factory, and, when a site is involved, the utility's own study before anything gets designed around them.
A written review with every known risk listed and a dollar figure next to it. You decide which risks to carry and which ones to pay to remove.
I'm there for factory acceptance, site acceptance, and commissioning. The job is done when the system is energized and has passed the acceptance tests we agreed to in writing.
17%
of storage projects missed nameplate capacity at acceptance testing. Commissioning delays of one to two months are the norm.
Accure, 2025 Energy Storage System Health Report
I read the contract before you sign and I'm there for the acceptance test, so the test, not the datasheet, decides what you paid for.
$42B
of tax credits changed hands in 2025, and nearly 40% of advisors say diligence has delayed a deal.
Crux, 2026 and 2024
The credit is worth what the file proves. I build the file the buyer accepts, or I tell you why they won't.
Buy, build, commercialize. One example of each, with the names left out.
Before you buy
Storage buyers evaluate unfamiliar suppliers and chemistries from datasheets, test reports, samples, and what the salesperson says. I have evaluated more than 30 cell and chemistry vendors on price, schedule, performance, and risk, including supplier and product reviews on the factory floor in China before any purchase.
What I found Products that did not meet the specification or the claims being used to justify the order.
What I did Wrote the lab test protocols and acceptance criteria, had samples tested independently, and held the supplier's numbers against measured performance before capital was committed.
Helped customers avoid more than $100 million in purchases of non-conforming product.
Before you energize
On a microgrid approaching commissioning, each piece of equipment passed its own test and the system still did not behave during integrated testing. I have evaluated existing electrical systems, equipment, and site conditions across more than $50 million of energy infrastructure, and this is the pattern that shows up most.
What I found The failure lived in the interfaces: the controls architecture, the equipment handoffs, and the utility's requirements, none of which any single vendor owned.
What I did Traced the behavior across the whole system instead of one component at a time, wrote a defined test sequence with the vendors and the commissioning team, isolated the failure modes, and specified the upgrades required before acceptance.
About $10 million of downstream remediation and project disruption avoided, and a system that passed the acceptance tests it had been failing.
Before you commercialize
A storage and microgrid business inside a larger company had a concept and no product: storage, power conversion, and controls assembled piece by piece in the field, slow to finish and hard to test before startup.
What I found Field assembly was the product's real cost. Every site was a first build.
What I did Took the concept to market as factory-built, field-deployable skids, built the supply chain in China and the offtake in Canada, recruited and led a team of more than 20 across two product lines, and carried the products through certification and the customers' diligence.
Two product lines shipped, with most of the build and testing moved into the factory where it can be repeated.
For founders and boards at seed and Series A energy hardware companies that need a CTO's decisions before they can afford the seat. One to two days a week, with a start date and an end date. I do not take a seat at a company that sells to my review clients.
Four US provisional patent applications as inventor, on battery thermal management, battery management and maintenance, and modular battery architecture. Two product lines taken from concept to market.
Tell me about the equipment, the contract, or the company. I'll tell you what I'd look at first.
Email meI love fixing things and I hate waste. That was my answer when a colleague asked for my "why" back in 2019, and it hasn't changed. A project stuck in a utility queue, a battery bought off a datasheet that fails in year two, a plant that can't get power on the date it was promised: all of that is waste, and all of it is fixable. I get more out of helping someone else's project succeed than out of being the one who built it, which is why I ended up on the owner's side of the table. Everything I do for a client has to be transparent and leave them better off, financially or operationally or both.
Three ways to start. Each is fixed price, quoted in writing within two business days, and done in ten. Projects from 1 to 150 MW; companies from seed to Series A.
You send the supplier's proposal, test reports, and warranty. You get a written review: red, yellow, and green findings, what each costs, and the contract protections to ask for. It covers the equipment and the paper, not the site design.
Fixed price. Ten business days from the day the documents arrive.
You send the bill of materials, the supplier certifications, and the purchase terms. You get the foreign-entity (FEOC) and material-assistance (MACR) file, the covered-list check on the power conversion, and the domestic content trail, in the format your credit buyer accepts. It supports your tax counsel. It is not legal or tax advice.
Fixed price. Ten business days.
You bring the product, the team, and the fundraising date. You get two days a week for a quarter: the architecture, the certification path, the first hires, and the investor calls.
Monthly. Start date and end date.
Send me the proposal you're about to sign, the supplier's compliance file, or the company that needs a CTO. I'll tell you what I'd look at first.
I reply within one business day.